Archive for the ‘Ralph Baze’ Category

Supreme Court Has a Typo in the Death Penalty Ruling: “Cruel and Usual” Punishment

April 18, 2008

Well, this is something that doesn’t happen very often.  A friend of mine pointed this out to me: in the first paragraph of Justice Breyer’s opinion on Baze v. Rees, he has a major misspelling (page 80):

Assuming the lawfulness of the death penalty itself, petitioners argue that Kentucky’s method of execution, lethal injection, nonetheless constitutes a constitutionally forbidden, “cruel and usual punishmen[t].” U. S. Const., Amdt. 8. (emphasis added)

That’s right, justice Stephen Breyer made his ruling on “cruel and usual” punishment.  And what makes this somewhat interesting is the fact that there were so many opinions, from each individual Justice, instead of the 6 justices joining with justice Roberts.  You  really don’t see this many opinions given for one case that often, but I guess it was a very important and controversial case.

So, there you go – even Supreme Court Justices make typos!

Done Spellchecking,

Ranting Republican
add to :: Add to Blinkslist :: add to furl :: add to ma.gnolia :: Stumble It! ::

Supreme Court Rules Lethal Injections for Executions Are OK

April 16, 2008

Today, the Supreme Court upheld allowing the death penalty by lethal injection in a 7-2 vote.  This is the opinion for the case Baze v. Rees (John D. Rees is the Kentucky Corrections Commissioner).  Ralph Baze was scheduled to die in Kentucky after killing a sheriff and deputy sheriff.  Here is an excerpt from the court’s decision (the full opinion is available here:

No. 07–5439. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008

Lethal injection is used for capital punishment by the Federal Government and 36 States, at least 30 of which (including Kentucky) use the same combination of three drugs: The first, sodium thiopental, induces unconsciousness when given in the specified amounts and thereby ensures that the prisoner does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Among other things, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol reserves to qualified personnel having at least one year’s professional experience the responsibility for inserting the intravenous (IV) catheters into the prisoner, leaving it to others to mix the drugs and load them into syringes; specifies that the warden and deputy warden will remain in the execution chamber to observe the prisoner and watch for any IV problems while the execution team administers the drugs from another room; and mandates that if, as determined by the warden and deputy, the prisoner is not unconscious within 60 seconds after the sodium thiopental’s delivery, a new dose will be given at a secondary injection site before the second and third drugs are administered.

Petitioners, convicted murderers sentenced to death in Kentucky state court, filed suit asserting that the Commonwealth’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” The state trial court held extensive hearings and entered detailed factfindings and conclusions of law, ruling that there was minimal risk of various of petitioners’ claims of improper administration of the protocol, and upholding it as constitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it does not create a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture,
or lingering death.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
217 S. W. 3d 207, affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, joined by JUSTICE KENNEDY and JUSTICE ALITO, concluded that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol satisfies the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 8–24.
1. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, an execution method must present a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of serious harm. A State’s refusal to adopt proffered alternative procedures may violate the Eighth Amendment only where the alternative procedure is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain. Pp. 8–14.
(a) This Court has upheld capital punishment as constitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 177. Because some risk of pain is inherent in even the most humane execution method, if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure, the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain. Petitioners contend that the Eighth Amendment prohibits procedures that create an “unnecessary risk” of pain, while Kentucky urges the Court to approve the “ ‘substantial risk’ ” test used below. Pp. 8–9.
(b) This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids “punishments of torture, . . . and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 136, such as disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain, id., at 135. Observing also that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death[,] . . . something inhuman and barbarous [and] . . . more than the mere extinguishment of life,” the Court has emphasized that an electrocution statute it was upholding “was passed in the effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result.” In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 447. Pp. 9–10.
(c) Although conceding that an execution under Kentucky’s procedures would be humane and constitutional if performed properly, petitioners claim that there is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly followed—particularly, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly administered to achieve its intended effect—resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are administered. Subjecting individuals to a substantial risk of future harm can be cruel and unusual punishment if the conditions presenting the risk are “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25, 33, 34–35. To prevail, such a claim must present a “substantial risk of serious harm,” an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825, 842, 846, and n. 9. For example, the Court has held that an isolated mishap alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment, Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459, 463–464, because such an event, while regrettable, does not suggest cruelty or a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Pp. 10–12.
(d) Petitioners’ primary contention is that the risks they have identified can be eliminated by adopting certain alternative procedures. Because allowing a condemned prisoner to challenge a State’s execution method merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative finds no support in this Court’s cases, would embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing execution procedures, petitioners’ proposed “unnecessary risk” standard is rejected in favor of Farmer’s “substantial risk of serious harm” test. To effectively address such a substantial risk, a proffered alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. A State’s refusal to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for its current execution method, can be viewed as “cruel and unusual.” Pp. 12–14.
2. Petitioners have not carried their burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Pp. 14–23.
(a) It is uncontested that failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental to render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and of pain from potassium chloride. It is, however, difficult to regard a practice as “objectively intolerable” when it is in fact widely tolerated. Probative but not conclusive in this regard is the consensus among the Federal Government and the States that have adopted lethal injection and the specific three-drug combination Kentucky uses. Pp. 14–15.
(b) In light of the safeguards Kentucky’s protocol puts in place, the risks of administering an inadequate sodium thiopental dose identified by petitioners are not so substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. The charge that Kentucky employs untrained personnel unqualified to calculate and mix an adequate dose was answered by the state trial court’s finding,
substantiated by expert testimony, that there would be minimal risk of improper mixing if the manufacturers’ thiopental package insert instructions were followed. Likewise, the IV line problems alleged by petitioners do not establish a sufficiently substantial risk because IV team members must have at least one year of relevant professional experience, and the presence of the warden and deputy warden in the execution chamber allows them to watch for IV problems. If an insufficient dose is initially administered through the primary IV site, an additional dose can be given through the secondary site before the last two drugs are injected. Pp. 15–17.
(c) Nor does Kentucky’s failure to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives demonstrate that the state execution procedure is cruel and unusual. Kentucky’s continued use of the three-drug protocol cannot be viewed as posing an “objectively intolerable risk” when no other State has adopted the one-drug method and petitioners have proffered no study showing that it is an equally effective manner of imposing a death sentence. Petitioners contend that Kentucky should omit pancuronium bromide because it serves no therapeutic purpose while suppressing muscle movements that could reveal an inadequate administration of sodium thiopental. The state trial court specifically found that thiopental serves two purposes: (1) preventing involuntary convulsions or seizures during unconsciousness, thereby preserving the procedure’s dignity, and (2) hastening death. Petitioners assert that their barbiturate-only protocol is used routinely by veterinarians for putting animals to sleep and that 23
States bar veterinarians from using a neuromuscular paralytic agent like pancuronium bromide. These arguments overlook the States’ legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death, and in any
event, veterinary practice for animals is not an appropriate guide for humane practices for humans. Petitioners charge that Kentucky’s protocol lacks a systematic mechanism, such as a Bispectral Index monitor, blood pressure cuff, or electrocardiogram, for monitoring the prisoner’s “anesthetic depth.” But expert testimony shows both that a proper thiopental does obviates the concern that a prisoner will not be sufficiently sedated, and that each of the proposed alternatives presents its own concerns. Pp. 17–23.
JUSTICE STEVENS concluded that instead of ending the controversy, this case will generate debate not only about the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol, and specifically about the justification for the use of pancuronium bromide, but also about the justification for the death penalty itself. States wishing to decrease the risk that future litigation will delay executions or invalidate their protocol would do well to reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide. Moreover, although experience demonstrates that imposing that penalty constitutes the pointless and needless extinction of life with only negligible social or public returns, this conclusion does not justify a refusal to respect this Court’s precedents upholding the death penalty and establishing a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of particular execution methods, under which petitioners’ evidence fails to prove that Kentucky’s protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Pp. 1–18.
JUSTICE THOMAS, joined by JUSTICE SCALIA, concluded that the plurality’s formulation of the governing standard finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or in this Court’s previous method-of-execution cases; casts constitutional doubt on long-accepted methods of execution; and injects the Court into matters it has no institutional capacity to resolve. The historical practices leading to the Clause’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights, the views of early commentators on the Constitution, and this Court’s cases, see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130, 135–136, all demonstrate that an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain. Judged under that standard, this is an easy case: Because it is undisputed that Kentucky adopted its lethal injection protocol in an effort to make capital punishment more humane, not to add elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the death penalty, petitioners’ challenge must fail. Pp. 1–15.
JUSTICE BREYER concluded that there cannot be found, either in the record or in the readily available literature, sufficient grounds to believe that Kentucky’s lethal injection method creates a significant risk of unnecessary suffering. Although the death penalty has serious risks—e.g., that the wrong person may be executed, that unwarranted animus about the victims’ race, for example, may play a role, and that those convicted will find themselves on death row for many years—the penalty’s lawfulness is not before the Court. And petitioners’ proof and evidence, while giving rise to legitimate concern, do not show that Kentucky’s execution method amounts to “cruel and unusual punishmen[t].” Pp. 1–7.
ROBERTS, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which KENNEDY and ALITO, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS, J., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which SCALIA, J., joined. BREYER, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER, J., joined.

Here are some excerpts from the opinions


We too agree that petitioners have not carried their burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment.


The issue presented in this case—the constitutionality of a method of execution—should be kept separate from the controversial issue of the death penalty itself. If the Court wishes to reexamine the latter issue, it should do so directly, as JUSTICE STEVENS now suggests. Post, at 12. The Court should not produce a de facto ban on capital punishment by adopting method-of-execution rules that lead to litigation gridlock.


The conclusion that I have reached with regard to the constitutionality of the death penalty itself makes my decision in this case particularly difficult. It does not, however, justify a refusal to respect precedents that remain a part of our law. This Court has held that the death penalty is constitutional, and has established a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of particular methods of execution. Under those precedents, whether as interpreted by THE CHIEF JUSTICE or JUSTICE GINSBURG, I am persuaded that the evidence adduced by petitioners fails to prove that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, I join the Court’s judgment.


As JUSTICE STEVENS explains, “ ‘objective evidence, though of great importance, [does] not wholly determine the controversy, for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment.’ ” Ante, at 14 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 312 (2002); emphasis added; some internal quotation marks omitted). “I have relied on my own experience in reaching the conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty” is unconstitutional. Ante, at 17 (emphasis added).

Purer expression cannot be found of the principle of rule by judicial fiat. In the face of JUSTICE STEVENS’ experience, the experience of all others is, it appears, of little consequence. The experience of the state legislatures and the Congress—who retain the death penalty as a form of punishment—is dismissed as “the product of habit and inattention rather than an acceptable deliberative process.” Ante, at 8. The experience of social scientists whose studies indicate that the death penalty deters crime is relegated to a footnote. Ante, at 10, n. 13. The experience of fellow citizens who support the death penalty is described, with only the most thinly veiled condemnation, as stemming from a “thirst for vengeance.” Ante, at 11. It is JUSTICE STEVENS’ experience that reigns over all.

* * *

I take no position on the desirability of the death penalty, except to say that its value is eminently debatable and the subject of deeply, indeed passionately, held views—which means, to me, that it is preeminently not a matter to be resolved here. And especially not when it is explicitly permitted by the Constitution.


These risks in part explain why that penalty is so controversial. But the lawfulness of the death penalty is not before us. And petitioners’ proof and evidence, while giving rise to legitimate concern, do not show that Kentucky’s method of applying the death penalty amounts to “cruel and unusual punishmen[t].”

For these reasons, I concur in the judgment.


Because Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol is designed to eliminate pain rather than to inflict it, petitioners’ challenge must fail. I accordingly concur in the Court’s judgment affirming the decision below.


I would therefore remand with instructions to consider whether the failure to include readily available safeguards to confirm that the inmate is unconscious after injection of sodium thiopental, in combination with the other elements of Kentucky’s protocol, creates an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary pain.

The governor of Virginia has already lifted his moratorium on executions.

This is a VERY good day for justice and law and order.  I’m glad that the Court reached this opinion.  For now, it seems as if there are no more obstacles being thrown at the legality of the death penalty.

Done Ranting,

Ranting Republican
add to :: Add to Blinkslist :: add to furl :: add to ma.gnolia :: Stumble It! ::

Supreme Court Hears Kentucky Lethal Injection Case

January 8, 2008

Today the Supreme Court heard arguments from Donald Verrilli, the lawyer of Ralph Baze, a death-row inmate who killed a sheriff and deputy sheriff.  Verrilli claimed that there is a severe risk of pain and agony if the anesthetic is not properly administered, but Roy Englert, the attorney representing the Commonwealth of Kentucky, claimed that “Kentucky has excellent safeguards in place” and is using a doctor who is skilled at administering drugs through needles.

At the heart of the Baze v. Rees (John D. Rees is the Kentucky Corrections Commissioner) is how judges should evaluate arguments that the current combination of drugs used to carry out the execution (sodium thiopental causes unconsciousness and stops breathing, pancuronium bromide causes paralysis, and potassium chloride stops the heart) causes enough pain to be considered “cruel and unusual punishment,” which would violate of the Eighth Amendment.  What is NOT being heard here is the constitutionality of the death penalty.

Verrilli wants the state to use sodium pentobarbital, a single drug which would cause unconsciousness and cardiac arrest.  There are three arguments against the use of the single drug (the latter two were discussed in a press conference after the Court heard the arguments):

  • The drug proposed is the same drug used to put down animals, so many states are reluctant to change to a system that would put down humans “the same as animals.”
  • When administered, the drug can cause “involuntary thrashing” and this would degrade the “dignity” of the execution procedure.
  • The drug has not yet been tested to show that it is indeed pain free in humans.

Another issue here is the fact that in the past, states have been reluctant to release execution information since it might compromise prison security and/or the safety of prison personnel.

Justice Antonin Scalia brought up an interesting point asking where it says that the state must use “the least painful method.  Is that somewhere in the Constitution?”  During the case, Scalia said, “This is an execution — not surgery.”

Justice John Stevens saw the case as bringing up a recurring issue and that “We’ll be right back here in a year or 18 months.”

Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Anthony Kennedy brought up (in my opinion) the most valid point when they asked Verrilli to assume for a moment that the current system was administered correctly (painlessly) in every execution. Justice Kennedy tehn asked, “Would you have a case here?”

Verrilli responded by saying that, “There can be no guarantee they will be properly administered.”  So that’s a big no to the Justices’ question.

I say that there needs to be more research done here – on BOTH methods.  If one method is better than the other – then use that.  But are people going to say that thrashing around is cruel and unusual?  If the Supreme Court isn’t careful, this could be the Griswold v. Connecticut of the death penalty that leads to its abolishment (Griswold v. Connecticut was the Supreme Court case that was taken out of context and used as a precedent to reach the Roe v. Wade verdict that legalized abortion).

Done Ranting,

Ranting Republican
add to :: Add to Blinkslist :: add to furl :: add to ma.gnolia :: Stumble It! :: ::

%d bloggers like this: